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Graduate before study ........ 25,194
Graduate before
examination ...................... 15,591 40,785
3 years completion .............. 1,528
2 years completion .............. 4,954 6,482
Grammar school .................. 4,506 4,506
No requirement ---_-------------- 28,540 28,540
122,508
It will seen from the above figures that 80% of the legal pro-
fession in the United States are classified higher than North Caro-





Handbook of Roman Law, by Max Radin. St. Paul, West Publish-
ing Company, 1927. Pp. xiv, 516. The Hornbook Series.
"This book is intended to be a brief and simple introduction to a
large and difficult subject. I hope that it may be intelligible to those
who have neither law nor Latin; but it is primarily designed for law-
yers and law students who wish to become acquainted with the more
elementary notions of the great system" of Roman Law.
If the thirty-three Hornbooks on common law subjects, and as
many more like them, were condensed into one' volume of five hun-
dred pages, would such a book give laymen enough understanding
of the common law to make its reading worth while? To what extent
do lawyers and law students turn to the Hornbook Series for any
purpose other than refreshing memory of large fields through con-
densed statements? For any other purpose, of what use is a
handbook?
Marcus Junius Brutus, ancestor of the Brutus of Caesarian fame,
referred, in 150 B. C., to the rule that a man who drove a borrowed
beast to a place further than the point he had borrowed it for, was
guilty of "theft" (a civil action against the tort-feasor on the part of
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the owner). In A. D., 1910, in New Jersey, one Sheffler borrowed
a mare in Englewood to drive to Hackensack, a distance of four
miles. He drove to Leonia, "a very considerable distance further,"
and was held liable for conversion therefor. By showing the con-
necting links between the two, a very striking example of continuity
is made out. One wishes that Professor Radin had employed (or
would yet employ) this "vertical" device to illustrate comparison
and contrast of Roman law ideas with common law concepts, such as
"culpa" and negligence or "causa" and consideration, even at the
expense of the extent to be covered.
However, except for a few such passages, inconsiderable in
amount, directed to the uninitiated, Professor Radin has turned his
attention from preface to finis and index, to the task of acquitting
himself honorably in the eyes of scholars and critics of Roman law.
That he has succeeded, there can be no doubt. Sound scholarship
and careful presentation are the outstanding features of the book.
But he has forgotten entirely those "who have neither law nor
Latin," and it is only occasionally that he remembers the "lawyers
and law students who wish to become acquainted with the more
elementary notions of the great system which has successfully dis-
puted the domination of the modern world with the law of Eng-
land." Insofar as Hornbooks are of value when they can be read
critically, in the light of background, this Handbook of Roman Law
may readily take its place among the best of the series. But the
very fact of condensation, where so much is compacted into so small
a space, seriously diminishes its value to the beginner.
W. N. EVANS.
University of North Carolina.
Rationale of Proximate Cause, by Leon Green. Vernon Law Book
Co., Kansas City, Mo., 1927. Pp. x, 216.
In order to form a basis for this review of Professor Green's
book and particularly for the reader who is not familiar with it,
Professor Green's analysis is herewith presented:
"'In any tort case all of the following inquiries arise. Any one
or more of them may present difficult problems. But it is seldom
that more than one or two of them give trouble in a particular case.
(1) Is the plaintiff's interest protected by law, i.e. does the plain-
tiff have a right?
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(2) Is the plaintiff's interest protected against the particular
hazard encountered?
(a) What rule (principle) of law protects the plaintiff's
interest?
(b) Does the hazard encountered fall within the limits of
the protection afforded by the rule?
(3) Did the defendant's conduct violate the rule which protects
the plaintiff's interest?
(4) Did the defendant's violation of such rule cause the plaintiff's
damage?
(5) What are the plaintiff's damages?"'1
Point (1) refers to the variety of claims of personality, property,
economic advantage, etc., which individuals are continuously calling
upon society to protect. Whether the law protects the injured in-
terest is always a question of law and must be answered in the plain-
tiff's favor before the case can go on. Claims for protection against
pre-natal injury, nervous shock, mental anguish present illustrations
of interests which may or may not be recognized by law. Whether
they are protected in one jurisdiction or not protected in another is
always a question of policy and has no connection with proximate
cause, although the courts usually assign proximate cause as their
reason for deciding the cases. While this is not new, it is to Pro-
fessor Green's credit that he has made the distinction clear.
Point (2) represents the author's original and distinctive con-
tribution. Admittedly, the determination of the rule or principle of
law which shall govern a case is seldom difficult. Ordinarily the
plaintiff invokes the proper rule for the protection of his injured
interest. Yet there are leading cases where this has not been so. In
Bird v. Jones,2 the defendant erected seats across a highway and
enclosed it so that the plaintiff could not get through. The plaintiff
sought to recover under the rules and principles of law governing
imprisonment. The decision was that he was not protected under
those rules. In the well known "Squib Case", 3 the question was
whether the plaintiff was protected under the rules of trespass.
Even if the rule invoked is a proper one, there is left the large
problem of its scope, the limits of its protection. That courts recog-
nize this problem where a statute has been violated is easily demon-
strated by an examination of the cases. To illustrate, in Gorris v.
1 Green, Rationale of Proximate Cause, pp. 2 and 3.
"7 Q. B. 742 (1845).
'Scott v. Shepherd, 2 Wn B1. 892 (C. P., 1773).
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Scott,4 the statute required vessels carrying live stock to have cattle
pens of small size to prevent the spread of infectious disease. The
plaintiff's sheep were washed overboard by rough seas. Had the
vessel been properly provided with pens, the loss would not have
occurred. Yet recovery was denied because the court considered the
purpose of the statute and decided that it did not extend to protect
against a loss occasioned by high seas washing live stock overboard.
When the violation of a statute is involved, the court must decide
whether the statute was designed to give protection to the plaintiff's
injured interest against the risk or hazard encountered. Similar
reasoning should prevail where the plaintiff has violated a statute
and the defendant sets up such violation in defense. Professor Green
discusses this in an article in the NORTH CAROLINA LAw REVIEW
(December, 1927) entitled "Contributory Negligence and Proximate
Cause." 5 The article really forms an additional chapter to his book.
He shows that the plaintiff is often entitled to recover in spite of
his violation of a statute, if the court decides that the statute was
not designed to relieve the defendant from his legal obligations.
Courts usually give as a reason that there is no causal relation be-
tween the violation of the statute and the plaintiff's loss, but such
reason is unconscious camouflage of the larger issues of policy.
Sutton v. Town of Wauwatosaq is typical. The plaintiff was driv-
ing his cattle to market on Sunday in violation of statute. The de-
fendant's bridge collapsed. The plaintiff was allowed to recover
because his violation of the Sunday law did not relieve the defendant
from maintaining the bridge in proper condition.
This process of determining the limits of protection of a rule
should be used whether the rule of law involved is statutory or
common law. While courts are accustomed to consider the purpose
of a statute, they refuse to give like consideration to the purpose of a
common law rule or principle. Courts should consider the scope of
every rule, common law or statute, and decide whether it protects
the injured interest against the particular hazard encountered. The
problem is present in all negligence cases, and, although the reviewer
was doubtful about it and somewhat startled by the idea, it is also
present in contract cases7 and in crimes,8 as Professor Green ably
'L. R. 9 Exch. 125 (1874).
86 N. C. L. Rev. 3.
"29 Wis. 21 (1871).
Green, Rationale of Proximate Cause, chap. 2.'Green, op. cit., chap. 3.
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demonstrates. In negligence cases, the problem has been constantly
confused with proximate cause.
Thus Points (1) and (2) of Professor Green's analysis are pure
questions of law which the judge should always decide. Moreover
they are often questions of policy, and innumerable factors must nec-
essarily be weighed. Points (3), (4) and (5) are questions for the
jury wherever the evidence raises any doubt. In a case where the
evidence on any of these points is conclusive, the judge should decide
the issue himself. Throughout the book, the author gives much
needed emphasis to the all important question of the province of the
court and jury.
As a test for determining proximate cause, the courts have de-
veloped the rule of probable consequences. Such a test has nothing
to do with causation and everything to do with negligence. Pro-
fessor Green had previously exposed this confusion.9 As a test for
proximate cause, the author uses Jeremiah Smith's suggested formula:
"Was defendant's conduct a substantial, factor in producing plain-
tiff's injuries?"1O This "substantial factor" test makes the cause
problem relatively simple. In fact, we discover that many causation
cases involve no such problem at all.
There are two sides to every case, the plaintiff's and the defend-
ant's. When it is decided that the defendant is a wrongdoer, that
is only a part of the solution of the case, often a very small part.
There may be many reasons why the plaintiff should nevertheless
not recover. Courts have inclined to lump these varied and complex
factors into one all-inclusive category of proximate cause. It is this
complex problem which Professor Green has so ably analyzed. Natur-
ally, he builds on the past. He finds much assistance in the work of
Jeremiah Smith, Sir John Salmond and Professors Bingham and
Bohlen." There is quite a resemblance between the conclusions of
Professors Bingham and Green, which the latter cordially recognizes,
'Green, Are Negligence and "Proximate" Cause determinable by the Same
Test (1923), 1 Tex. L. Rev. 243, 423.
125 Harv. L. Rev. 303.
Jeremiah Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 Harv. L. Rev. 103,
223, 303; Salmond, Torts (6th ed. 1924), 131-172; Bingham, Legal Cause, 9
Col. L. Rev. 22, 139; Bohlen, The Probable or Natural Consequences as the
Test of Liability in Negligence, 49 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 79. Reference is also
made to the leading article by Professor Beale, The Proximate Consequences
of an Act, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 633, and the subsequent articles by Edgerton,
Legal Cause, 72 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 349, and McLaughlin, Proximate Cause, 39
Harv. L. Rev. 153.
